role in the explanation of wage differentials in developed countries [Dickens and Katz, 1987; Krueger and Summers, 1988; Katz and Summers, 1989] . Models dealing with discrimination [Daneshvary, 1993; Macpherson and Hirsch, 1995] , rent-sharing and union action [Blanchflower et al., 1996; Di Nardo et al. 1996 ] also have an important role in the determination of wage differentials.
In the case of developing countries, however, investigation of wage differentials has focused, firstly, on the contribution of human capital variables to earnings [Corbo and Stelcner, 1983; Lam and Levison, 1992; Psacharopoulos and Velez, 1992; Yamada, 1996] , and secondly, on the stylised facts that labour market is segmented along the lines of moderntraditional sectors [Harris and Todaro, 1970] , formal-informal sectors [Tokman, 1983; Castells and Portes, 1989] , public-private sectors [Lindauer and Sabot, 1983; Macedo, 1985; Fields and Wan, 1989; Teal, 1996] , and foreign-national ownership companies [Morrison, 1994; Teal, 1996] . In addition, the effects of restrictive labour legislation [Thomas and Valleé, 1996, Marshall, 1996; Rama, 1995 Rama, , 1997 Carneiro, 1997] , minimum wages [Morrison, 1994] , and trade unions [Teal, 1996; Arbache 1999; Arbache and Carneiro, 1999] are also believed to affect wage dispersion, while competitive theories and segmentation explained by efficiency wage models have received less attention as a source of wage variance.
In Brazil, wage differentials have long been a source of attention due to the high income inequality that characterises the country [Langoni, 1973; Bacha and Taylor, 1978; Cowell et al., 1996] . Studies of interindustry wage differentials in the 1980s based on micro-data have found that about 50 per cent of inter-industry wage dispersion could be explained by standard wage equations [Pinheiro and Ramos, 1994; Gatica et al. 1995] . The unexplained wage dispersion was attributed to alternative sources, especially industry affiliation. Competitive theories, such as compensating differentials and unmeasured abilities, were considered as irrelevant, despite the fact that these models were assessed very indirectly in these papers. Furthermore, these studies did not test, for example, the importance of job conditions and the impact of turnover costs on wage dispersion, which is regarded as an important source of wage differentials [Krueger and Summers, 1988; Katz and Summers, 1989] . Turnover may be particularly important for Brazil, not only because of training aspects, but also as a result of dismissal costs, which are particularly high in this country [Amadeo and Camargo, 1993] . All these variables may play a crucial role in wage determination, and their absence prevent us from analysing their effects on wage dispersion. As a consequence, we may overestimate the variance in wages.
The aim of this article is to test the importance of several competitive and non-competitive theories of wage determination. The analysis presents two contributions. First, we empirically test many wage determination theories for Brazil. Second, the assessment is carried out in a period full of economic reforms, including several stabilisation plans, trade liberalisation, privatisation of state companies and deregulation of markets, thus enabling an evaluation of the effects of structural adjustments on the wage formation and wage differentials of an industrialising country. 1 To the extent that the understanding of the causes generating wage differentials can provide normative and positive implications to issues such as income distribution, educational and training programmes, employment, trade and industrial policies, empirically testing a wide range of wage differentials theories is essential for development of policies and for assessing their effectiveness.
The article is organised as follows. Section II presents some stylised facts on inter-industry wage differentials and a theoretical review of theories of wage differentials and their explanation of wage dispersion. Section III empirically assesses the importance of several theories in explaining the wage variance for selected years from the 1980s and 1990s. Section IV concludes.
II. THEORIES OF WAGE DIFFERENTIALS
The empirical literature has shown that wage differentials are a pervasive phenomena in market economies, and are strongly associated with the industry the worker is affiliated to, which is the critical issue in the dual labour market theory from Doeringer and Piore [1971] . There are three stylised facts that challenge the traditional theories of wage differentials: (i) temporal stability of wage structure; (ii) similarity of wage structures between countries in different stages of economic development; (iii) certain industries pay high wages to all workers, while other industries pay lowwages to all workers for given occupations and human capital characteristics. The next paragraphs present theories that attempt to shed light on these issues.
Transitory Differences
Inter-industry wage differentials can be a consequence of inter-sectoral shifts in labour demand that follow the changing demand for specific products. The changes in product demands can be due to technological innovations, external competition, changes in tastes, alterations in relative prices or any other type of exogenous (and unexpected) changes. Accordingly, industries which face increasing demands for their products tend to pay relatively higher wages, since they have a tendency to make excess profits during the transitory period. In the presence of imperfect information or adjustment costs, the change in demand may generate not only frictional unemployment, but also wage differentials during the period of adjustment. Although the process is not instantaneous, wage differentials tend to decrease and converge in the long run toward the market clearing wage.
Many authors find high temporal stability and high correlation of the inter-industry wage differentials of many countries [Krueger and Summers, 1987; Gittleman and Wolff, 1993] . Krueger and Summers [1988] , Abuhadba and Romaguera [1993] , Arai [1994] , Morrison [1994] , Pinheiro and Ramos [1994] among others, find a high temporal wage stability for countries in which labour markets and institutions governing the wage bargain are very different (such as Sweden, the United States, Ecuador and Brazil). These findings cast doubts on the relevance of the transitory difference model to explain wage differentials. Krueger and Summers [1987] address this empirical evidence to the market and technology structures which are intrinsically associated with industry, even in less developed countries. The transitory differences theory does not explain the stylised facts that employers pay similar wage premia to workers with different levels of human capital, and in jobs with different levels of risk.
Unmeasured Abilities
The unmeasured ability hypothesis is based upon the idea that employers screen workers not only by their measured abilities, like schooling and experience at work, but also by their unobserved skills. This sorts them into industries according to the demand for measured and unmeasured characteristics.
2 Since unmeasured abilities are not, by definition, directly captured by datasets, these productive characteristics are not accounted for in ordinary econometric estimations. In order to justify the inter-industry average wage differentials, we may have to assume that a high average wage industry -that is an industry that pays relatively high wages to workers whatever their human capital characteristics -has a disproportionate number of workers with high measurable and unmeasurable abilities.
One possible way to explain the common empirical evidence that wages are correlated across occupations is that there is an endogenous labour distribution according to employers' demand for workers' abilities. This would lead to a positive relationship between technology and measured and unmeasured workers' abilities, thus explaining the differences between industries' average wages [Groshen, 1991] .
Firm-specific training may play an important role in the explanation of wage differentials. The argument is that a worker who receives specific training increases his/her skills and abilities demanded by a particular firm or industry. As a consequence, his/her marginal productivity and relative wage are higher than in any other firm or industry, thus causing wage differentials between workers who are 'supposed' to be equally skilled [Abowd et al., 1999] . In these circumstances, despite having firm-specific training, the worker's opportunity cost is still the ongoing wage, since his/her firm-specific skills are not well recognised or valued by other employers.
Compensating Differentials
The compensating differentials theory argues that high wages are simply compensating differences for job conditions within and among firms. Employers who offer different working conditions in terms of safety (for example, injury rate), uncommon risk of lay-off, physical exertion, overtime worked, and undesirable environment (for example, noise, humidity and ventilation), should appropriately compensate workers for their job attributes. In order to explain wage differentials, one could argue that job attributes vary from industry to industry or even from firm to firm, and thus ordinary controls for job conditions would not properly capture the particularities and effects of job attributes on wages. The compensating differentials theory does not explain why some industries pay high (low) wages to all occupations, since there is no a priori reason to pay a white collar worker the same premium paid to a blue-collar worker who usually works in harder conditions.
Monitoring and Shirking Model
The shirking model has received extensive treatment in the literature [Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Bulow and Summers, 1986] . Its basic idea relies on the assumption that workers have some discretion concerning their work effort, and there is a continuous monotonic cost to monitor them. In order to motivate equally able workers to strive hard in their performance, employers pay a wage higher than the worker's opportunity cost, which is given by the market wage or by the level of unemployment benefit. The higher the difference between the paid wage and the alternative wage, or the higher the unemployment rate, the higher the fear of being fired, since in these circumstances the job becomes more attractive, encouraging the worker to try harder. The shirking model predicts that wage differentials appear as a consequence of the difference in monitoring costs between firms or industries. Although very suggestive, this theory is not able to explain why wages are correlated across occupations, since one would not expect that different occupations would require the same monitoring level.
Turnover Costs Model
The general assumption of this model is that turnover is costly to firms. This leads them to create wage policies to avoid such costs from quits, training and hiring new workers, which are, by supposition, basically provided by the firm [Salop, 1979; Stiglitz, 1986; Weiss, 1980] . The microeconomic foundations of these costs are explored in Oi [1962] , and his main argument is that labour may be a fixed, rather than a variable cost. Each occupation in a specific firm requires specific training to enable an ordinary worker to increase his productivity, since the firm and the occupation possess peculiarities that require a complementarity between capital and the labour force. A trained worker is defined as a quasi-fixed production factor because the firm incurs costs for hiring and training, which are considered to be an investment of the firm in its labour force. The higher the fixed costs in recruitment and training to improve labour's productivity, the longer the expected period the worker will be engaged in the firm. Thus, in order to minimise turnover, the firm offers a wage premium. These arguments are used to justify the positive relation between job tenure and wage differentials. In order to explain inter-industry wage differentials, the turnover models have to assume that an industry that pays on average a positive wage premium should have a high number of positions that require firm-specific trained workers, and that fixed costs cut across occupations, which would justify the correlation of wage premiums for say, white and blue collar workers.
Sociological Model
Human resource managers have two choices to elicit productivity of workers: through a rigid monitoring system and disciplinary policy, or an incentive system, which motivates employees through a mix of pecuniary and non-pecuniary inducements. The sociological model relies on the second choice and believes that industrial relations are governed by motivations. Akerlof [1982 Akerlof [ , 1984 introduces the idea that there is more than a pure bilateral exchange of labour for money between firm and worker. Akerlof stresses that social conventions and norms of the work group have a strong effect on the workers' attitude. Workers acquire sentiment for each other and for the firm, and as consequence, they develop a commitment and loyalty to the firm's aims, which motivates them to work hard. But they expect a return or reciprocity from the firm, which is hoped to be given in a 'fair' package that includes not only a higher relative wage compared with what they would receive elsewhere, their past wages, and unemployment rate but also non-pecuniary compensations such as lower pressure of supervisors, and the firm's attitude to laid-off workers. The notion of fairness also relies on how profitable the firm is, and how essential the worker is to the firm and to its goals.
The most relevant contribution of this model to the understanding of wage differentials is its explanation for the common empirical finding on the correlation of wage premia across occupations, which would be due to workers' collective attitudes. Although this theory has an interesting justification for the correlation of wage structures within a firm, it is hard to believe that workers in different occupations have sufficient discretionary power over their work to lead them to affect significantly their own productivity in order to establish an exchange relationship with the firm. Also, it is not clear why a productive (and altruistic) worker who is a member of a team would look after a team-mate who is less productive, but benefits from his/her effort.
III. ASSESSING THE THEORIES OF WAGE DIFFERENTIALS
Our empirical analysis on wage determination is based on micro-data from the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostras por Domicílio (PNAD), from the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), and on aggregate data from the Relatório Anual de Informações Sociais (RAIS), from the Ministry of Labour, for various years between 1984 and 1998. 3 The investigation of the wage structure is carried out for the 2-digit manufacturing industry level. 4 The micro-data sample is composed of (labour market active) individuals, non-employers, between the ages of 18 and 65, working 21 or more hours a week (full-time) in the main job.
Wage Structure Stability and Transitory Differences
The transitory difference theory is particularly appealing in the analysis of the Brazilian labour market due to the economic reforms carried out in the 1980s and 1990s. In order to assess this theory, we compute the temporal Spearman rank correlation coefficient for raw inter-industry wage differentials based on PNAD data. To estimate the wage premia we employed the Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt [1997] methodology. The results in table one show that the wage structure is quite stable. This result is striking, since one could expect that the stabilisation of inflation, trade liberalisation and the other reforms undertaken in the 1980s and 1990s would change the wage structure. This however does not seem to be the case, suggesting that the wage structure is not responsive to short run economic reforms. To some extent, the results from table one should be regarded carefully, since the inter-industry wage differentials are not controlled by workers characteristics. Table 2 shows an alternative estimation of temporal correlation that accounts for control variables. The results now present a slightly different picture in quantitative terms as compared to Table 1 , but the qualitative results remain the same. The correlation coefficients are as stable as those in the previous table, supporting the finding that the wage structure seems not to be affected by economic changes, even after control variables are included in wage equations.
Our results support the stylised fact that the wage structure is stable over time. The temporal stability of the wage structure casts doubt on the effects of transitory labour demand and short-run shocks on wages. Overall, the results indicate that the wage structure is permanent, and that the wage dispersion is not explained by movements in relative wages across the manufacturing sector.
Unmeasured Abilities
Considering that the variables in our micro-data sets may not satisfactorily capture all productive individual attributes, one could argue that the unexplained wage differentials reflect unmeasured labour quality. As we are dealing with individual data, the issue is then whether differences in average wages paid in different industries are related to differences in average levels of unmeasured abilities that are captured by employers but not by the econometrician.
Since there are no longitudinal data in Brazil to carry out firstdifferenced estimations to test unmeasured abilities as in Krueger and Summers [1988] , Murphy and Topel [1990] , and Gibbons and Katz [1992] , we adopt an alternative approach to assess the relevance of this theory following closely the weak versus strong version of the screening hypothesis [Psacharopoulos, 1979; Cohn et al., 1987] . 5 We estimate wage equations for a sub-sample of workers with tenure less than one year in the present job, and for a sub-sample with tenure larger than ten years, other variables held constant. The first group of workers is labelled as 'beginners', while the second is labelled as 'long-tenure workers'. We assume that the labour assignment of beginner workers is given by screening. Thus, education works as an informational device for identifying workers' abilities. If we take workers with similar productive observable characteristics, then we hypothesise that firms may not identify workers' differences in abilities and capabilities, at least at the very beginning of the workers' contract.
6 Therefore, beginners tend to be paid the industry's average wage for a given job. However, as time goes by, the workers acquire firm-specific training, and unmeasured abilities and talents for the given job do appear and become recognisable through their differences in productivity. As a consequence, earnings of workers with similar measurable productive characteristics tend to diverge rather than to converge over time. The direct implication is that beginner workers' wages are less dispersed than long-tenure workers' wages.
In order to test the above proposition, Table 3 shows the weighted and adjusted inter-industry wage dispersion of controlled and non-controlled wage equations for beginners and long-tenure workers. Seeking to have a sensible sample size, we pooled data from PNAD of 1990 to 1998. PNADs from the 1980s do not have the variable 'tenure', which prevents an assessment for this period. The results in table three show that the wage dispersion of long-tenure workers estimated with and without controls are about two times higher than that of beginners, thus supporting our hypothesis. This finding contradicts the strong screening hypothesis.
If we assume that ability is complementary to schooling [Rosen, 1989] , then the return rate of schooling will be higher for the more able workers, since this variable is capturing the effect of non-observed abilities [Card, 1998] . Correspondingly, the rate of return of education of long-tenure workers is 0.115, while it is 0.081 for beginners, thus suggesting that to some extent, unmeasured abilities and unrecognised talents are captured by the education variable.
Compensating Wage Differentials
Compensating wage differentials is an appealing theory for assessing industry wage differentials in Brazil due to the substantial heterogeneity in the technological level of its establishments and therefore to substantial heterogeneity in job conditions. There are national and multinational companies in the same industry using high technology and modern managerial systems, alongside low-scale production firms employing informal workers in hazardous and insecure workplace environments. Since work condition variables are not included in our wage equation estimations, it could be argued that wage dispersion for equally productive workers could result from compensating differentials. Unfortunately, there is no survey on individual job attributes in Brazil. We therefore adopt an aggregate analysis approach. We regress manufacturing inter-industry wage differentials on industry injury rate, firing rate, and temporary contract rate. All these variables express unpleasant job conditions. Injury, firing and temporary contract rates were drawn from RAIS. We expect to find a positive correlation, thus implying that wage premia compensate for unpleasant job conditions. Table 4 reports the results for OLS cross-section regressions. 7 Apart from the injury rate for 1986, all other statistically significant coefficients are negatively correlated with the wage premium variable, thus opposing the theoretical prediction. Thus, industries that experience higher levels of firing and temporary job contracts are also the ones that pay lower wage premium. 8 These results seem to be in accordance with LDC's labour market characteristics. Because good job opportunities are scarce and social security is limited, most workers are forced to take the available rather than the desired job. Polacheck and Siebert [1993] point out that not only tastes affect attitudes of workers to risky jobs, but also economic circumstances such as poverty, which push poor people to take unpleasant and riskier jobs without being appropriately compensated. To some extent, such arguments 120 THE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES Notes: Other variables in the models are education, gender, urban and work card. (*) significant at the five per cent level. (**) significant at the ten per cent level. The inter-industry wage differentials were estimated using the Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt [1997] approach.
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tend to support the negative signs. The compensating differentials theory does not appear to explain the wage determination in Brazil, at least at the two-digit manufacturing industry level. Further research however is needed using both more detailed industry-level and occupation-level data.
Turnover Costs
The main assumption of the labour turnover model is that turnover is costly to firms, which leads them to create wage policies to avoid the costs associated with quits, training and hiring. To test this model's predictions that different firms have different incentives to pay wage premia seeking to prevent turnover costs, we regress wage differentials on turnover. Following Pencavel [1980] , Dickens and Katz [1987] , and Katz and Summers [1989] , we expect to find a negative correlation, which would mean that high-wage industries have lower turnover levels, while low-wage industries have higher turnover levels. Table 5 shows the results of such regressions. The coefficients of turnover are always negative, as predicted, although they are statistically significant in only five out of 12 years.
9 Figure 1 provides more insights on the issue showing a negative relation between turnover and wage premia. The figure was built using pooled data from 1985 to 1998. These evidences suggest that turnover seems to play a role in the determination of wages in Brazilian manufacturing.
To evaluate the turnover model from another perspective, we follow Krueger and Summers [1988] and Arai [1994] and regress inter-industry wage differentials on job tenure. Their argument is that if workers from high-paying industries earn wage premia, we should expect to find a positive relation between job tenure and wage differentials, since a lower turnover rate is reflected in longer job tenure.
10 Table 6 reports the coefficients on job tenure and show that, apart from 1990, the relation between the wage premium and tenure is always positive as expected, suggesting that the length of job tenure affect the wage premium. Figure 2 shows the correlation between wage premium and tenure using pooled data from 1990 to 1998. The relation is positive as expected, supporting the previous finding that turnover is a source of wage determination in Brazil. This result might be related to the high severance pay and the high costs of training associated with the low supply of skilled workers.
Monitoring and Shirking
In this model, a dispersion in wages between comparable work arises as a result of the differences in monitoring costs between firms or industries. In this respect, it has been assumed that monitoring is more costly in large firms due to the need to employ higher-skilled workers to match the capital- intensive requirements, which are more common in larger plants [Hamermesh, 1980; Dickens and Katz, 1987] . Since skilled workers are more difficult to monitor, there would have to be a positive relation between firm-size and wages. In order to assess the prediction that larger firms pay higher wage premia, we compute the Spearman rank correlation coefficient between inter-industry wage differentials and industry average firm size (in terms of employees). We expect to find high and positive correlation, as found by Mellow [1982] , Dickens and Katz [1987] , Krueger and Summers [1988] and Brown and Medoff [1989] .
To run the test, we use firm size data aggregated in industry level from the RAIS-Establishments, which accounts for the number of employees from about 180,000 manufacturing firms each year for 1988, 1992 and 1993 (see Appendix for details). We did not assess other years of the 1990s due to changes on the 2-digit industry definition. The correlation results are 0.43, 0.64, and 0.53, respectively, which are positive and statistically significant as expected, thus providing some evidence of the monitoring and shirking models' prediction for the explanation of wage differentials. However, since other theories also predicts this relation, our results on the monitoring and shirking theory should be regarded with caution.
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Sociological Model
One important prediction of the sociological model is that firms pay high or low-wages to all their workers because of norms, loyalty feeling, and fairness considerations. The literature has been relying on this model to explain the high and stable correlation of wages among skilled and unskilled workers, and among workers with different levels of seniority, given by job tenure and age [Krueger and Summers, 1988; Gatica et al., 1995; Romaguera, 1991; Moll, 1993] . We assess the above prediction by estimating the correlation coefficient of the inter-industry wage premia of workers belonging to different groups of age, education and tenure. If the prediction applies, then we should find high and positive coefficients throughout. Table 7 reports the results for selected years in the period 1984-98. All coefficients are statistically significant, suggesting the relevance of the sociological model to the explanation of wage differentials. These results imply that the sociological model seems to play an important role in the determination of wages. Therefore, an industry that pays high (low) wages to some workers, say, the more educated, does pay high (low) wages to all workers, thus creating an element of segmentation and rigidity in the wage structure.
THE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The investigation of the sources of wage determination and wage dispersion in developing countries has concentrated on the effects of both human capital variables and different sources of segmentation associated with the institutional arrangements and structural characteristics of these economies on earnings. In this article, however, we test several competitive models, and labour market segmentation theories as described by efficiency wage models for Brazil. Our main results are the following. The wage structure has not changed over 1984-98, a period marked by successive inflation stabilisation plans and market-oriented economic reforms. This finding strongly support the stylised fact that the wage structure is stable over time. We found some evidence that unmeasured abilities affect wage determination, thus explaining the wage dispersion for workers with comparable measurable productive traits. We found no evidence in favour 125 WAGE DIFFERENTIALS IN BRAZIL of the compensating wage differentials theory, which may have to do with the low opportunity costs of the large majority of workers. The efficiency wage theory, represented by the turnover, monitoring and sociological models, seem to play an important role on the wage formation in manufacturing.
The above findings explain, at least in part, the inter-industry wage differentials not explained by ordinary wage equations, and highlight sources of rigidities and segmentation in the Brazilian labour market. Regarding the policy implications, it appears that economic policies aimed at affecting different aspects associated with the manufacturing labour market might achieve better results if they considered the fact that the labour market is rigid, along the lines of efficiency wages, while not neglecting the impacts of unmeasured abilities on wage determination. , 1986 , Plano Bresser, 1987 , Plano Verão, 1989 , Planos Collor I e II, 1990 , and Plano Real, 1994 , but only this last one successfully reached its aims. For details on the trade liberalisation and other reforms of the 1990s, see Moreira and Correa [1998] and Loser and Guerguil [1999] . 2. One major strand of literature, the screening hypothesis, contends that education is used by employers primarily as a screen to sort out workers with high ability. Thus, a certain rule is used to select workers. It may happen that uneducated individuals are passed over even if they are able in favour of those who are educated. 3. For detailed information on the datasets, see Appendix. 4. We recognise that this level of aggregation misses a lot of variation. The aggregation level is due to reliability of data and compatibility of PNAD and RAIS. 5. The weak version of the screening hypothesis says that employers offer higher starting salaries to the more educated relative to the less educated in the absence of any other information on the new employees expected productivity. The strong version says that employers will continue to pay higher wages to the more educated, after the employee has been with them for some time [Psacharopoulos, 1979: 181] . 6. Layard et al. [1991] point out that the longer a worker stays in a job, the more their talents are recognised. 7. We assessed the period 1985-93 only due to commensurability of job conditions data. 8. We run fixed effects models (not reported), but the results suggested that industry fixed effects are not appropriate to capture the relationship of job conditions and inter-industry wage differentials. The estimated coefficients of job conditions appeared very small and insignificant, and the R-square and F statistics dropped dramatically, reaching very small figures. 9. Fixed effect models were estimated, but the results suggest very little variance of turnoverindustry. 10. This procedure may perhaps be subject to an endogeneity problem. Tenure data are available from 1990 only.
collected the following way: every employer must send the RAIS forms containing a comprehensive set of information on each of its workers such as monthly wages all over the past year, nature of labour contract, schooling, age, sex, place of birth, nationality, job tenure, job classification, among others to the Ministry of Labour once a year. A special aspect of RAIS is its very large employment coverage, which is about 22 million workers a year. RAIS can be roughly considered as a labour and establishment census, although the Ministry of Labour estimate that around 35 per cent of the formal employment is not recorded due to lack of completion of the questionnaire. Self-employed, employers, informal employment and illegal activities are not recorded by the RAIS census. RAIS is developed with the aim of providing information to identify workers entitled to receive social benefits and to monitor the labour market. Despite the fact that RAIS is a longitudinal data base, published data are aggregated on one-, two-and three-digit industry levels.
